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Revisiting Critical Theory in
the Post-September 11 World
Identity, Security, and Democratic Governance
There is a consensus within debates on terrorism that the aim of terrorist acts is "very much
larger than the direct physical destruction" they cause.' The September 11 attack illustrates
this point very clearly, in so far as the effect it generated in the world went far beyond the
physical destruction of killing around 3,000 innocent people. Its effect has also gone far
beyond its political aim, which, voiced by Al Q!Leda leader Osama bin Laden, was to create a
"clash of fundamentalisms" in world politics in the name of the Islamic Jihad, against infidel
American imperialism in particular, and Western modernity in general.
Since U.S. president George Bush defined September 11 as a "war on the homeland" and
responded to it by unilaterally declaring a global war on terror, we have seen the emergence
of a number of radical developments, changes, and crises in world affairs. It has become pos-
sible to characterize the "present" as the post-September 11 era. The unlilateral declaration of
a U.S.-Ied global war on terror, aimed at revitalizing the state'-centric international politics,
and based on the normative and strategic primacy of security issues over global-wide social
justice probleqIs, has concretized, unearthed the concealed problems of key international
institutions, such as the UN and the NATO, created a split in the precess of European inte-
gration, and divided the world into those who are the friends of the U.S. and those who are
against the war on terror. Thus, in the name of a global war on terrorism, the state-centric
reordering of world affairs has operated not only by establishing a linear causality between
the fight against terrorism and war, but also by codifying difference as a direct or indirect
threat to security. In this sense, both the September 11 attack, and the state-centric response
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to it, have created a radical change in international relations, in which we seem forced to
choose between security and liberty, hegemony and autonomy, community and individuality,
state-centric nationalism, and democratic cosmopolitanism.
In this article, I suggest that there is another possible response to terrorism, a democratic
response which approaches terrorist attacks as a "crime against humanity" and defines
September 11 as a terrorist attack not only on America but on humanity as a whole, and
promotes and puts into practice cosmopolitanism and multilateralism as the philosophical
and political basis for our global fight against terror. 2 I argue that such a democratic
response to terrorism should be constructed on the basis of a theoretical framework capable
of explaining and reflecting upon international relations in the post-September 11 era.
Critical theory has the potential to do this, since its modus vivendi aims not only to analyze
critically the present nature of world affairs, but also, and more importantly, to alter it in
such·a way that democratic global governance can be made possible. The existing critical
theories of international relations, whether it be postmodern, Gramscian or Habermasian,
all operating still at the level of metatheory, fall short of framing such a democratic response,
in so far as they are, in their own ways, preoccupied either with identity-issues, economic
processes, or discourse. ethics. In this sense, I suggest that a viable democratic response to
September 11 requires an attempt to reconstruct the e'xisting critical theory of international
relations in su<;:h a way that not only provides a powerful critical analysis of the present
nature of world affairs, but also promotes a democratic global governance which approaches
"international security," "sustainable economic development" and "democratization" as inter-
twined processes or problem-areas: In ~oing so, critical theory functions as a theoretical basis
for democratizing the key institutions of international relations, international organizations,
nation state and global civil society and their interactions, and locates its democratic
response in their cosmopolitan and multilateral fight against terrorism.
In substantiating these suggestions within what follows, I will first delineate the way
in which critical theory, operating not only as a "metatheoretical critique" of the existing
positivist and rationalist theories of international relations, but also as a "first-order theorizing"
about the structure and dynamics of the international system, has the potential to provide us
with a more adequate and feasible theoretical framework for constructing a democratic
response to terrorism. 3 Second, I will focus on what I call "international relations in the
post-September 11 era" and also the different perceptions of the "Other" in this era, both
of which will provide an adequate ground for the reconstruction of critical theory. This
attempt will allow me to delineate my suggestion that the post-September 11 era requires a
reconstruction of critical theory that enables it to become a viable and adequate ground for
the creation of a powerful democratic alternative to the current state-centric operation of
international relations.
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Critical Theory, Modernity, and International Relations
First emerging as an alternative to positivist and rationalist philosophical discourses of
modernity, critical theory aims at breaking with the empirico-analytical conception of theory
in order to see that what is regarded as "objective" is always "humanly objective," that is,
"historically subjective." The most clear expression and articulation of the suggestion of the
"objective" as "humanly subjective" can be seen in Antonio Gramsci's intervention on the
positivist distinctions drawn between objective fact and subjective value, the universal and
the particular, and science and ideology:
Objective always means 'humanly objective' which can be held to correspond exactly
to historically subjective: in other words, objective would mean universal subjective.
Man knows objectivity in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human racebistori-
cally unified in a single unitary cultural system. But this process of historical unification
takes place through the disappearance of the internal contradictions which tear apart
human society, while these contradictions themselves are the condition for the
formation of groups and for the birth of ideologies which are not concretely universal
but are immediately rendered transient by the practical origin of their substance. 4
Gramsci's suggesti'ons in this quotation, conceiving objectivity as historically subjective,
situating knowledge in a historically unified cultural system, and underlining the intertwined
character of knowledge and interest, clearly demonstrates the specificity of critical theory
vis-a-vis positivism and rationalism. More specifically, and within the context of international
relations theory, by approaching the structure and dynamics of the international system not
as "an ontologically given reality" but as "a historically and intersubjectively constructed
practice," critical theory draws our attention to the intertwined character of knowledge/
power relations. It thereby demonstrates that what is presented as objective, factual, scientific
and universal is always and already embedded in an historically and discursively constructed
system of power and domination. Thus, the basic objective of critical theory cannot be only
to explain the existing structure of international relations, but also to alter it into a more just
and democratic system of governance. It is in this sense that critical theory functions not
only as an explanatory but also as an "emancipatory and democratic mode of theorizing"
about international relations. 5
As critical theory attempts to explain and reflect upon the structure and dynamics of the
international system, it puts forward two interrelated propositions.
The first proposition concerns the intertwined character of knowledge and power.6
Critical theory argues that what is at stake in theories of international relations is not only
explanations about the existing "political conditions in the modern world" but also, and more
importantly, "expressions of the limits of the contemporary imagination" about creating an
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alternative, just, and democratic world.7 In this way, critical theory attempts to discover how
knowledge claims about international relations function also in the service of power and
domination by imposing a set of epistemologic;al and normative limits on both our under-
standing of the world and our attempts to imagine making it just and democratic. In this
sense, the modern practice of inclusion/exclusion, embedded in the objectivist epistemological
procedures and representations of reality, as well as in claims to universality, has been central
to the functioning of international relations theory. Thus, the suggestion that critical theory
puts forward that the "objective" is in fact historically subjective, enables us not only to see
that international relations theory operates as power/knowledge, but also to search for
alternatives that enlarge the horizon of the contemporary political imagination about the
modern world.
The second proposition concerns the way critical theory approaches and defines
theoretical activity. Contrary to positivist and rationalist theories of international relations,
critical theory regards theoretical activity not as a neutral instrument or an abstraction that
aims at explaining the existing international system on the basis of a set of epistemological
distinctions drawn between the objective fact and the subjective value, the universal and
the particular, and science and ideology, but as "a (cultural) criticism," a "lens" through which
one, as an active subject, attempts to problematize the world, to critically analyze interac-
tions between the international organizations, the state, and civil society, and searches for
possibilities of creating a just, emancipatory, and democratic global governance. Thus, as
Andrew Linklater has pointed out, critical theory has to articulate philosophical, empirical,
and practical concerns.
At the philosophical level, critical theory will have to provide an alternative world order
grounded in concepts of freedom and universality that are historically derived. Empirically, it
has to construct a sociology of constraints upon the realization of these concepts, and practi-
cally, it has to provide us with strategies of transition to bridge the gap between the two.8
These two propositions, namely conceiving theory as power/knowledge and theoretical
activity as a practice of explanation and reflection, enables critical theory both to gain
specificity as a first-order theorizing about the structure and dynamics of the international
system, and to differentiate itself from the positivist and rationalist theories of international
relations, by attempting to enlarge our political imagiriation about creating alternative and
democratic world visions. Thus, not only does critical theory call into question the very
language, concepts, methods, and discourse of the existing structure and dynamics of the
international system, it also helps us to think of the world in which we live differently and
democratically.
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The Post-September 11 World
Understood and put into practice in this mode, critical theory becomes an important
theoretical device to explain and reflect upon the current state of international relations,
which have been increasingly marked by the September 11 terrorism and its devastating
impacts on our world. Today, it is possible and necessary to define the world in which we live
as the post-September 11 world. A quick glance at recent discussions about the impacts of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on global politics reveals that there have been three
important ruptures that the September 11 terrorism created in world affairs. These ruptures,
which have brought about a number of fundamental and radical ambiguities in world affairs
and global politics, have altered the current state of international relations and the existing
structure and dynamics of the international system. A point of clarification is worth
emphasizing at this point. Unlike the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration
that has tended to characterize the post-September 11 era as a totally "new stage," "new
condition," or "new epoch" in international relations, I am suggesting that to speak of the
nature of the present world affairs and global politics as the post-September 11 era should
entail the recognition of "continuities and changes" in international relations. In other words,
to speak of the post-September 11 era is to recognize the novelty of the crucial impact of the
September 11 terrorism on international relations without losing sight of the continuing
fundamental problems of the existing international system in terms of security, social justice,
and democratization.
These ruptures concern (a) "the emergence of the world risk society," (b) "the changing
nature of American hegemony," and (c) "the globalization of violence." 9 Today, we live in a
"world risk society" which involves ambiguity, uncertainty, and ontological insecurity about
the nature, as well as the future, of international relations, derived from the fact that terrorism
is a serious and real danger, and operates as a globalized act of violence and intimidation
directed mainly against the innocent. The September 11 terrorist attack and subsequent
attacks in Istanbul, Madrid, London, Bali, and Egypt, have given rise to the idea of a "world
risk society." It should be pointed out, however, that the idea of a "risk society" is not new.
Recent environmental hazards and accidents on the one hand, and the increased number of
devastating financial crises in different parts of the world on the other, have already demon-
strated that we live in a globalizing world in which modern societies are becoming risk
societies. lO Likewise, the September 11 terrorism has generated an important change in the
way in which American foreign policy acts as a hegemonic vision of the world. It has resulted
in the reconstruction of hegemony on the basis of the privileged status of (a) military power
and security over economic power and social justice, (b) unilateralism over multilateralism,
(c) politics as a friend-foe relationship over politics as negotiation, (d) hard power over soft
power, and (e) community and security over liberty and freedom. With this change, the new
American foreign policy, operating as a neo-conservative ideology of power and domination,
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has attempted to reorganize global politics and world affairs through the acts of war and
occupation. 11 Of course, American foreign policy has been hegemonic in the post-WWII
order, but it is the neo-conservative re-articulation of American foreign policy through the
above listed principles that has given rise to the emergence of rupture in its modus vivendi in
the post-September 11 world.
Both of these radical transformations in global politics and world affairs - the emergence
of the world risk society and the neoconservative operation of American hegemony - have
also resulted in a significant rupture in globalization, in that violence and terrorism, rather
than a free market and social justice, have become the constitutive elements of the present
nature of inter- and intra-national relations. 12 The increasing attention to the problems of
violence and terrorism in globalization discourse has led to the neglect of both global social
justice issues, such as poverty and inequality, and global democracy problems, such as human
rights violations and the reduction of cultural difference to a dangerous foe.
Perceiving the Other in the Post-September 11 World
As a result of these ruptures in global politics and world affairs in the post-September 11
world, the question of how to perceive or approach cultural difference has become a question
of utmost importance, in so far as it places the concept of the "Other" at the centre of any
attempt to understand the post-September 11 world, or to explore the possibility of democ-
ratic governance in this world. 13 One can discern at least four different conceptions of the
"Other" in this context:
i) The Other as an Empirical/Cultural Object> Approached this way, the Other is regarded
as an object that can be accounted for through collecting facts. Here, the intention is
to explain the Other by providing so-called objective and factual knowledge of the Other.
It" should be noted immediately, however, that this notion of the Other is an outcome of
the cultural essentialism embedded in the "modernizationist" dichotomy drawn between
modern (Western) and traditional (non-Western). In this respect, although it is assumed
that a search for objective and factual knowledge leads to a better understanding of other
subject positions and cultures, such a search is embedded in an a priori characterization
of the Other as a fixed entity, a non-Western subject which lacks essentially what the
modern subject has, i.e., rationality, modernity, reason, progress. In fact, as Talad Asad
correctly points out within the context of anthropology, what objective and factual knowl-
edge provides is a substantiation of the already established classification of non-Western
culture in accordance with "Europe's story of triumph as progress."14 Thus, the Other
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then becomes defined with respect to what it is not rather than what it is. It constitutes a
cultural object whose condition of existence reveals a lack of everything the modern self
possesses. It is approached from within the privileged and universal category of the modern
self as a rational thinking subject and is represented as an inverted image of that self. In
the post-September 11 world, this perception of Other as an empirical/cultural object
operates as the dominant mode of approaching difference, mainly and concretely to the
Islamic identity, and can be seen in the nea-conservative ideology of the new American
foreign policy, the racism of the extreme-right in Europe, and in the discourse of
Islamic fundamentalism about Western modernity.
ii) The Other as Being> Employed in the theories of international society, as well as in
liberal institutionalism and constructivism, the Other as being refers to "the under
ground" of the modern self, that which contributes to the constitution of the self. These
theories not only write about the Other but also attempt to discover new relationships
to the Other by exploring the cultural and historical quandaries of his/her "self." This
conception of the Other breaks radically with both the empiricist collection of facts
and the cultural dissolution of the Other into the privileged modern self. However, by
regarding the Other as a historical being, as a "real" historical existence, both interpretive
and existential discourse operate in the regime of modernity, maintain the self/Other
opposition, and fail to break with the category of the Other as a discursive construct. The
liberal and social democratic approach to Islam in Europe, and the recent calls for the
idea of, and the need for, "inter-civilizational" dialogue, both employ the perception of
the Other as being.
iii) The Other as a Discursive Construct> Viewed in this way, the Other constitutes "an
object of knowledge" constructed by various discourses and institutions. In his influential
book, Orientalism, Edward Said shows how the entity called the "orient" was constructed,
even produced, during the post-Enlightenment period, as the Other in such a way that
"European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient
as a sort of surrogate and even underground self."15 On the basis of the epistemological
and ontological distinction between the Orientand the Occident, the oriental Other
was constructed and functioned as an integral part of European material civilization
and culture. This conception of the Other brings about an epistemological and philo-
sophical break with the modernist conception of the self, both by rejecting the historicist
account of the subject as a historical being and by relocating the question of the Other
into systems of representation. This conception of the Other as a discursive construct
provides a strong criticism of the neo-conservative and meta-racist perceptions of the
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Other as an empirical/cultural object, and makes it possible to see that the total reduction
by these discourses ofIslam to the dangerous foe, a potential terrorist or an object to be
controlled, which is initiated at the level of representation is, in fact, a strategy aimed at
securing the dominance of the West over the non-West.
iv) The Other as Different> Although Said's attempt to unearth the discursive character of
the Other produces a significant breakthrough, it does not say much about the Oriental
Other in itself. This is a result of Said's over-preoccupation with the discursive construction
of the Orient as an object of knowledge, which constructs a binary dichotomy between
Oriental and Occidental. In Said's attempt, the oriental Other becomes a totalizing and
homogenous construct which does not permit understanding of the Other in itself, in its
own cultural and historical specificity. This critique of Said leads to the conception of the
Other as different, which allows for a consideration of the complex structures of cultural
and national identity. Hence, the Other as different emphasizes the relational character
of the self and the Other, allows room for a critical examination of the mutual dependence
between colonizer and colonized, and shifts the focus to the question of identity/difference,
all of which makes possible a careful deconstruction of the self/Other binary opposition
as the basis of the cultural essentialism of modernity. This perception of the other as
different can be seen in the post-colonial theories of European identity, multiculturalism,
migration, and the subaltern subject. It has been used as a strong criticism of the recent
attacks on multiculturalism in Europe, as well as of the meta-racist approaches to the
question of European identity.16
Revisiting Critical Theory
In order to respond effectively to these ruptures and transformations in international rela-
tions in the post-September 11 era - the emergence of a world risk society, the unilateral
fortification of the American hegemony, the new configuration between violence/terror and
globalization, and the neo-conservative, meta-racist, and Islamic fundamentalist approaches
to the Other - critical theory needs to be reconstructed in a way that no longer functions as
a second-order or metatheory, but "consist[s] of first-order theorizing about the structure
and dynamics of the international system."17 In doing so:
i) Critical theory should recognize that the world in which we live is increasingly marked
by the idea of the world risk society, in which the relationships between the self and the
Other, the self and nature, and the self and his/herself, are confronted by the dilemma
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of the tension between security and liberty, and develop its response by confronting this
dilemma by approaching security and liberty in relation, and intertwined. This way,
critical theory accepts the basic parameters of world risk society, but at the same time
urges democratic governance on the basis of an interconnected understanding of the
relationship between security and liberty;
ii) Thus, critical theory, with its modus vivendi of democratic global governance, provides
a strong alternative to the unilateral operation of American hegemony, and in doing so,
promotes (a) the principle of multilateralism that will frame the functioning of interna-
tional organizations, nation-states, and global civil society, (b) the idea of politics as
democratic and participatory deliberation that will resist its articulation as a friend-foe
opposition, and (c) notions of tolerance, dialogue, and coexistence that will confront
the discourse of the "clash of civilizations."18 On the basis of these principles, critical
theory constitutes the philosophical and normative foundation of the multipolar world
vision supported by the agencies of trilateralism, namely those of international regimes,
regional organizations, and global civil society;
iii) The multipolar world vision of democratic global governance in the post-September 11
era requires a critical analysis of neo-liberal globalization and its free-trade ideology. In
this sense, critical theory, while attempting to construct a democratic alternative to the
unilateral operation of American hegemony, also functions as a transformative discourse
of globalization which takes, as its starting-point, the problem of global justice. 19 Thus,
critical theory aims at altering the existing nea-liberal globalization by suggesting that
the problems of inequality, poverty, recognition, and participation, embedded in the
domain of social justice, constitute global problems that require global solutions. Hence,
critical theory locates global social justice at the centre of the globalization debate, and,
in opposition to unilateralism, attempts to link security problems with those of sustainable
economic development and democratization;
iv) In doing so, critical theory pays attention to global civil society and global civil resistance
to neo-liberal globalization, and promotes the bottom-up, rather than the top-down,
direction of globalization. This way, critical theory has the potential to transform the
"anti-globalization" discourse, voiced within global civil society, into the "alter-globalization
discourse" that forces the important and powerful actors of the multipolar world vision,
namely those of (the universal and the regional) international organizations and the
nation-states, to produce effective arid long-term solutions to the problems of global
social injustice. 2o
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On the basis of these four functions, a reconstructed critical theory not only explains the
existing structure and dynamics of international relations in the post-September 11 era, but
also can give a democratic direction to it. That direction has not been taken by the Bush
administration with its neo-conservative ideology in its response to September 11, and as a
result, the effect of terrorism has gone very much beyond its direct physical destruction. It is
for this reason that it is necessary and timely to focus our attention, both theoretically and
strategically, to the direction that critical theory can provide for us.
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